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yet, the class also includes nonsexual offenses. One of
these is cruelty to animals.
The view that the rationale of the law could be, in
addition to the protection of one individual from another,
also the punishment of "moral wickedness", has been
called "legal moralism."2 Henceforth, I shall use the
term "morality" to refer to the corpus of beliefs and
customs that are allegedly impaired by the "victimless
crimes" and that legal moralism aims to defend; and
the term "morals" to mean what is covered by the laws
intended to protect one individual from another. In this
sense, rape can be defined as a crime against morals,
while homosexual relations between consenting adults
can be-and often is-considered a crime against
morality. Legal moralism, usually endorsed by
conservatives, is criticized by liberals. The view that it
may be possible to defend by legal, or else social,
sanctions the conformity to a particular code ofbehavior
that is shared by the majority at a certain time seems
unacceptable to those for whom the memory of the
Inquisition is raised by the contemporary revival of
religious fanaticism.
Thus, if the crimes against animals fall within the
victimless crimes, i. e., the crimes against morality, the
reaction against the movement for the defense of
animals becomes explainable. The tolerance of the
lobby is acceptable, or better, right, in a liberal society.
If, however, the new sect becomes too aggressive, and

In the framework of Western democracies, the
movement for the prevention of cruelty to animals has
been seen, ever since it dawned, as a lobby-a pressure
group born to defend some spiritual inclinations, or
subsidiary preferences, of some members of the political
community. In the first case, the most suitable
comparison is with a religious sect, or with a moralizing
organization; in the second one, with some association
of a more or less corporate nature. Still now, every
time an opportunity for debate arises, people take care
to present "impartially" the relevant views; here the
animals' advocates, there the butchers, the furriers, the
experimenters. In the democratic game, every lobby
must get its due.
This does not happen by accident. There is in our
societies a particular class of criminal actions called
"morals offenses." It has been noticed l that, since
murder, e. g., is also an offense against morals, such a
definition cannot be interpreted but in a restrictive sense,
and that "morals offenses" are therefore only those
crimes which impair nothing but morals. In fact, it is
to the absence of an injured party that the other relevant
expression, "victimless crimes," is related. Adultery,
sodomy, incest and prostitution are the main examples;
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tries to enforce its positions through argued personal
and political requests and, if possible, also through the
law, the charge of legal moralism, or rather, of
Khomeinism (where the term is to be understood as:
the highest conceivable level of zealotry) makes a
sudden appearance. Those who champion the cause of
animals would therefore be reactionary, while those who
defend the status quo would be progressive; and those
who require, e. g., that we stop eating meat are
comparable to the followers of a religious creed who
ask for the abolition of every other religion, or to
orthodox heterosexuals who ask for the prohibition of
homosexual relations.
The argument seems plausible, but it isn't. In fact,
it begs the question-it assumes just what it should
demonstrate. That the crimes against animals are
equivalent to the crimes against morality, that they are
in fact crimes against morality, must be argued. One
cannot simply assume it, let alone rely upon the fact
that it is so according to the laws in force. The existence
of societies which condemn association between white
and colored people as immoral and punish it by law
still leaves the question to be argued; as it has been
emphasized, this is where the argument begins, not
where it ends. 3
It is therefore worth surveying the shared framework
of the defenders of the status quo. The very concept of
victimless crimes clearly reveals that such a definition
makes sense only in connection with the idea that,
paradigmatically, crimes have victims. The charge of
zealotry presupposes a view which is quite familiar to
liberal theory and is usually associated with the so-called
"Mill's principle."4 So, by choosing as a ground for
discussion this middle-level principle-which is
compatible with different substantive positions-not
only do we not start from debatable premises, but in
fact we resort to an ad hominem argument.
Mill's principle, expounded and justified in the short
treatise On Liberty, is, so to speak, a two-sided coin.
Toward the end of the volume Mill summarizes in two
maxims: "(These) maxims are, first, that the individual
is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as
these concern the interests of no person but himself.
Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other
people if though necessary by them for their own good,
are the only measures by which society can justifiably
express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct.
Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the
interests of others, the individual is accountable, and
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may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other
is requisite for its protection.',5 These two sides of the
coin originated the two denominations which are used
for the principle: principle of liberty (and not of
tolerance, as some are paternalistically prone to say),
and harm-to-others principle.
On Liberty raised countless discussions. There
have been, of course, radical critics who rejected the
very principle, either by arguing that there are good
reasons for compelling conformity to social morality
and for punishing diversions from it even when these
do not involve harm to others or by maintaining that
since "no man is an island," it is practically impossible
to identify classes of action which harm no one but
the individual who performs them. Yet, the debate
concentrated to a considerable degree on clarification
and specification. Besides, those who accepted the
principle on its general terms usually focused their
attention on the second side of the coin, since the area
of the first one, ruled by principle of liberty, coincides
with the space that the harm principle does not cover,
and expands or narrows according to the interpretations of the latter.
"(T)he only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others."6 Of this concise fonnulation, in which Mill
summed up the harm principle, there are in particular
two elements that lend themselves to analysis: the
concept of "harm" and the concept of "others." As to
what should be meant by "harm," the discussion was
lively; apart from the basic distinction between private
and public harm, the concept has been qualified in
quite different ways as for its extension, and has
included, among other notions, the ones of hurt,
offense and nonbenefit. In contrast, the concept of
"others" received less attention. The other has long
been taken for granted-"other" was, generically,
every human being. Apart from the issue of
paternalistic intervention, where the individual who
would be protected is the same that causes the harm,
and which is the main target for Mill's darts ("Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual
is sovereign"?), the question of the recipient of the
harm has not been regarded as especially relevant till
not long ago. Recently, however, the importance
acquired by a particular ethical dispute has brought it
to the forefront.
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one should not try to force others to follow one's own
view of morality, is no longer possible. Before taking
any position we must set, and seriously face, the problem
of the moral status of nonhumans.
The resistances which such an approach come up
against are remarkable. The tendency to merely neglect
the members of other species is so deep-rooted in us
that even John Stuart Mill, who as a utilitarian defended
the view that animals are part of the moral community
to a degree,lO is not free from it. And this even in On
Liberty. In fact, while discussing liberty in the religious
sphere, he cites, as a case among others, the prohibition
against eating pork in force among Mussulmans; and,
as he considers whether it be acceptable to forbid nonMussulmans as well to consume it within the borders
of an Islamic country, he concludes: "The only tenable
ground of condemnation would be, that with the
personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of
individuals the public has no business to interfere."ll
The problem of the possible violation of the interests
of the animals raised for food is not even taken into
consideration, and the question seems to be tackled
exactly on the terms till now submitted to criticism.
The case of Mill is surprising because it is
contradictory. Other cases are so on different grounds.
In that semblance of a trial against Rumanian dictator
Nicolae Ceausescu the proceedings of which were
divulged by the press all over the world, the man who
plays the part of the prosecutor enumerates to the
accused his crimes against the people: among the major
charges there is the fact that, under his regime, the
people could not eat meat. The complete moral
irrelevance of those who are not human is so natural
that, at the very beginning of a revolution against an
absolute power, the possibility of wielding the most
absolute power over animals is vindicated as an
infringed right.
We are still far from the moment when these events
will bewilder the general public. However, I believe
that the arguments in favor of the inclusion of animals
in the sphere of moral equality are stronger than the
traditional arguments in favor of their exclusion, and
that, if the field of discussion remains that of rational
ethics, sooner or later we shall have to acknowledge
that animals are "others"-that in their case differences
cannot be mechanically turned into inequalities. Should
it so happen, we shall also admit that, when relations
with non humans are involved, we are on the
"protective" side of the coin-the one that is covered

In Practical Ethics, Peter Singer writes:
Mill's view is often and properly quoted in
support of the repeal of laws that create
"victimless crimes"-like the laws prohibiting
homosexual relations between consenting
adults, the use of marijuana and other drugs,
prostitution, gambling and so on. Abortion is
often included in this list.. .. Those who
consider abortion a victimless crime say that,
while everyone is entitled to hold and act on
her own view about the morality of abortion,
no section of the community should try to force
others to adhere to its own particular view. In
a pluralist society, we should tolerate others
with different moral views and leave the
decision to have an abortion up to the woman
concerned. The fallacy involved in numbering
abortion among victimless crimes should be
obvious. The dispute about abortion is, largely,
a dispute about whether or not abortion does
have a 'victim' ....To use [Mill's] principle as
a means of avoiding the difficulties of
resolving the ethical dispute over abortion is
to take it for granted that abortion does not
harm an 'other'-which is precisely the point
that needs to be proven before we can
legitimately apply the principle to the case
of abortion."g
As far as abortion is concerned, this idea is shared
by almost all moral philosophers, who therefore focus
their attention on the moral status of the fetus. But let
us try to substitute the issue, e. g., of the righmess of
meat-eating for the rightness of abortion, and the subject
"nonhuman animals" for the subject "fetus," and we
shall realize that the problem is the same. The fact that
most people do not take it into consideration doesn't
modify the situation. It is true that throughout our
cultural history the "animal question" has been rarely
put forward and even more rarely, if ever, taken
seriously. But from the beginning of the Seventies, the
ethical reflection which has given rise to the corpus of
the philosophy of animal liberation has radically
changed the situation, as it has challenged the
assumption that the factual differences between us and
the other animals can automatically be turned into moral
inequalities, and thus into a difference in trcatment. 9
Today, simply saying that when animals are concerned,
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1977); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983); Steve F. Sapontzis,
Morals, Reason and Animals (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1987); and James Rachels, Created from
Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990).

by the harm-principle, and not the one covered by the
principle of liberty.
This way would follow the direction of ethical
progress as it is conceived by William E. H. Lecky when
he describes the moral community as an expanding
circle, which embraces first the family, then a class,
then a nation, then all humanity, and finally the animal
world. 12 Lecky himself gives a particularly significant
example of the changes which have already occurred:
"The gladiatorial games form, indeed, the one feature
of Roman society which to a modem mind is almost
inconceivable in its atrocity. That not only men, but
women, in an advanced period of civilization-men and
women who not only professed, but very frequently
acted upon a high code of morals-should have made
the carnage of men their habitual amusement, that all
this should have continued for centuries, with scarcely
a protest, is one of the most startling facts in moral
history."13 I do not think it necessary to develop the
analogy further.

10 See John Stuart Mill, Whewell on Moral Philosophy,
quoted in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.), Animal Rights
and Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1976), pp. 131-132.
11

John Stuart Mill, op. cit., p. 285. My emphasis.

12 William E. H. Lecky, History ofEuropean Morals (New
York: George Braziller, 1985), p. 100-101. (First published:
Longmans, London 1869.)

13 Ibid.,

p. 271.
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